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A quotation concerned with the problems of military
economic decisions suggests the subject and the approach
of the analysis of Aviation Maintenance Organizations that
follows:
Efficiency in Military Decisions
... It is our conviction that something can be
accomplished by (this) . . . approach alone—that is,
by improved understanding of the nature of the
problem—even without greater use of systematic
quantitative analysis and with no changes in govern-
mental structure. ... If the alternatives are
arrayed, and a serious attempt made to apply sound
criteria in choosing the most efficient ones,
decisions are likely to be Improved even though the
considerations brought to bear are mainly qualitative
and intuitive.
Sound analysis, it might be noted, can not only
help identify efficient courses of action but can also
improve incentives. The existence of good analysis
cannot alter penalties and rewards so that "what is
good for the chief of each department is also good for
national security"
. . . (but) their existence . . .
may increase the cost to decision-makers of making
uneconomic decisions. ... It should at least be
possible to remove some of the perverse incentives
injected by such factors as special constraints, the
premium placed on getting budgets raised rather than
using budgets more efficiently, and cost-plus-fixed-
fee contracts. There must be some way to provide
postmasters and depot managers with more appropriate
motivations, as well as to improve the government's
decision-making machinery.
Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics
of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Santa Monica: The RAND
Corporation, 196*0) , R-346, pp. 107-09.

2The incentive perversities that the quotation above
considers are often recognized as present in a non-market
economy such as the military establishment. Several authors
have examined the general causes of this problem and have
suggested the conceptual framework for analysing specific
p
organizational incentives and rewards. Beyond this,
however, economists have not attempted to apply the
principles they espouse to particular military organizations
It seems to me that is unfortunate because an "improved
understanding of the nature of the problem" by military
managers must have root in the specific environment of
their organization. Broad economic concepts of efficiency
become useful when clothed in particulars. Simon points
out that classical administrative science has failed in
"making operational the definitions of key variables and
of providing emperical verification for . . . (its)
propositions . . . ", and the same weakness will accompany
any class of theories that does not move on to operational
adoption.
2Charles J. Hitch, "Economics and Military Operations
Research" ( vianta Monica - The HAND Corporation, 1958),
p-1250, pp. 10-12, 19-20.
Roland N. McKean, Efficiency in Government Through
Systems Analysis (A RAND Corporation Research Study. New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 8.
3james G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 33.

3This paper deals with only the Naval Aviation
Maintenance Organization. It attempts to state a general
systems theory of the maintenance organization to assist
the maintenance officer to abstract from the nature of his
operations the properties of an individual problem. The
nature of the organization is expressed as a function of
the resources it uses, the costs or penalties it pays for
its resources, and the services it performs as an end
product. Several assumptions are made: First, the limiting
factor of an aviation organization's ability to reach its
objectives is its maintenance. The squadron or air
station's resources of pilots, operations department and
administrative department services, etc., are so plentiful
that they do not act as a restraint on flight time. Since
only the maintenance department limits the unit's output,
we can ignore the other functions of the aviation
organization when considering ways to improve the
organization's performance. Second, assume that the
management of the organization acts only in the best
interests of that organization and that the personal
incentives imposed on unit managers are the same as the
incentives of their organization; managers are rewarded
only according to the success of their squadron or unit.
Third, the maintenance officer is the individual within
the organization that controls the maintenance function.

4Actually, all commanding officers reserve some authority
from the maintenance that affects maintenance, but his
decisions are passed to the maintenance officer for action,
so we can view the maintenance officer as personifying the
maintenance function.
Military systems design would be greatly simplified
if designers could work with a clean sheet of paper. But,
military systems changes have historically been piecemeal
corrections to existing designs. The best designers have
attempted to gain the improvement they desire with the least
possible change, instead of rebuilding the entire structure.
To make this type of change, it is necessary to start with
a thorough understanding of the system as it is.

CHAPTER II
MEASURING THE ORGANIZATION'S OUTPUT
Hitch has generalized on the criterion problem as
critical in an analysis of military organizations. The
maintenance officer faced with the problem of improving his
organizational performance must first resolve what the
organization is producing and how the product is_ being
measured. He must determine what constitutes better
performance; he must choose a criterion or index that will
indicate how well his organization is doing. It is easy
enough to do this if he uses only his own satisfaction
as an indicator. With his "feelings" as a guide, he has
a continuous, very sensitive barometer for measuring the
organization's output. He "knows" whether the safety
program is operating well or poorly, whether the crew is
dragging its heels, when quality control is not right,
when morale is low or high, because his intuition is the
measure of these things and, therefore, he is the best
Judge (only judge) of the current status of operations.
^Hitch and McKean, op. cit
. , pp. 158-181.
Charles S. Hitch, ^n the Choice of Objectives
in Systems Studies", Systems : Research and Design
,
Donald
P. Eckman, editor (proceedings of the First Systems
Symposium at Case Institute of Technology, New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1961 ), Chapter 3.

6Military intuitive judgement has been soundly damned by
just about everyone, including most military men, and it
is not necessary here to elaborate on its weakness. Not
considering the compatability of the maintenance officer's
intuitive criteria with national or other high level
criteria, but only the interests of the maintenance officer,
the major weakness of personal criteria is that they ignore
the standards of excellence used by the next higher level
of supervision to judge the organization's performance.
To a great extent, "good" performance is defined by the
particular Air Group Commander, Fleet Air Commander, etc.,
and the maintenance officer's criteria must adapt at least
this higher influence.
This suggests another possible strategy for arriving
at a workable criterion; use the criteria handed down by
higher authority. If the Air Group Commander or CVA
Commanding Officer says that a low AOCP rate , low accident
rate, or high morale are his indices of a good squadron,
then accept this as given and final. Certainly, self
preservation requires that authoritative criteria must be
used, whether it agrees with national or other higher
level criteria or not, but this has several pitfalls for
the maintenance officer. First, it is very difficult to
determine exactly what criteria one's superiors are using.
Squadrons and other aviation units have at least two bosses,

7BUWEPS and an operational commander. Very often the direc-
tives from these two sources are in conflict and the unit
management must choose between them. More often, the
guidance given the unit is worded in "principles" or "broad
policy" statements that are useless for definitive decision
making and require the maintenance officer to make his own
judgements. Also, the individuals assigned to billets
superior to the aviation unit change, and the maintenance
officer that relies on authoritative criteria will not
find complete continuity from one individual to the next.
A third source of criteria for the aviation main-
tenance function is often espoused: high level national
policy objectives. It is difficult to see how the main-
tenance officer can go wrong using such criteria as "military
worth", "maximum national security", and "greatest possible
efficiency and economy of operation" to measure his oper-
ational output. The trouble with this type of measure is
that is is impossible to translate into useable low level
standards. "Nobody knows precisely how (for instance),
satisfaction, military worth, and national well being are
related to the observable outcomes of various courses of
action. We have not the models or the wit to translate
those outcomes into such terms. "5 a blimp squadron commander
^McKean, op . cit . , p. 19.

8might view an increase of his airship allowance as in the
national interest where CNO judges that the continued op-
eration of even one blimp is an indefensable extravagance.
Individual levels of authority do not judge the implemen-
tation of high level policy objectives in the same way,
and criteria that use this language merely attempt to wrap
intuitive criteria in sacred and unassailable justification.
A RAED Corporation Report in 1958 considered the
problem of a proper measure of effectiveness of an oper-
ational aircraft maintenance system. This report constructed
a model of a maintenance unit using "Aircraft-in-Commission"
time as a measure of effectiveness. The author indicated
that this criterion was not critically selected since the
object of the report was to demonstrate a conceptual
approach to model construction of production processes in
which random variations play a major role. "Aircraft-in-
commission" time, however, is in general use as a main-
tenance measure of effectiveness and demands close analysis
in an investigation of useful criteria. By using aircraft-
in-commission time, the effects of variability in the flight
°R. A. Levine and R. B. Rainey, "Random Variations
and Sampling Models in Production Economics" (Santa Monica
The RAND Corporation, 1958), P-1552.
^Appendix A diagrams the simulation model used for
the study.

9schedule and the weather are ignored. Using this model,
the maintenance officer minimizes the total time that air-
craft are waiting for maintenance. The aircraft with the
least amount of work required is assigned the highest
priority for work since it can be returned to an "up"
status soonest. As the status of aircraft changes because
of returning flights or delivered AOCP parts, personnel
are shifted from longer jobs to jobs that offer a quick
return of "in commission" time.
Naval aviation organizations have kept records of
aircraft availability or aircraft-in-commission for some
time. If this were a useful measure of effectiveness of
a maintenance system, it would have certainly been
universally adopted for judging performance by now. The
fact is that it has not. The reason why lies in the
division of objectives assigned to operating units.
BUtfEPS management control encourages the maintenance
department of an operating unit to go about its business
of repairing aircraft in isolation from the unit's oper-
ational objectives. The maintenance department's avail-
ability report, prepared for 3UWEPS , is a statement of
the aircraft in commission at a particular time each day.
Similiarly, the HAED report indicated earlier totaled all
aircraft-in-commission time. The BUWEPS availability
reports essentially sample from the same data that the
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BAHD Study, in its experiment, measured totally. The use
of aircraft-available time as the criterion for the measure-
ment of maintenance performance assumes that the objectives
of the total squadron or unit are optimized when the number
of hours that aircraft are ready to fly is maximized.
This appears to fit well with higher level objec-
tives for combat aviation units; maximum hours that air-
craft are combat ready appears to optimize national
security objectives. ° But, the maintenance department
cannot ignore the fact that it is supporting the flight
operations of the unit, and the unit's operational
objectives are stated in terms of flight time or number
of completed missions. Further, though the influence of
BUWEPS' incentives for "availability" are recognized, the
operational incentives for "flight time" are much stronger.
The unit's operational tasks are established by
"requirements" based on a "military judgement of needs" y
o
Or does it? Levine and Eainey, op_. clt . , in their
discussion of the Aircraft Maintenance Model as largely
controlled by random variations, point out that queuing
models can be solved only for the steady state and the
beginning of a war is not a steady state. Perhaps the
peace time objective of Aircraft Maintenance is not "com-
bat readiness" but rather "training", as measured by
flight time.
^Hitch, P-1250., op_. cit
. ,
p. 4, describes military
judgement and the "principles of war" as rationalization
of precedents and analogy, expressing nothing more than
individual preferences and prejudices.
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determined by superior commands and the unit's commander.
Hitch points out that " . . . (to) prepare requirements
on the basis of needs alone . . . is, of course,
nonsense. . . . Some notion of cost, however imprecise,
is implicit in the recognition of any limitation". Most
units find that the tasks required of them are always just
a little bit more than they can produce; and when, by
unexpected good luck or miscalculation, the unit does
meet all tasks, it finds that its task level has been
raised. To the superior command, controlling the utiliza-
tion of the squadron, real costs to him do not vary with
the squadron's output. He has no incentive to allow the
squadron to decrease output, since the funds he has
available must be either spent or lost. He gains nothing
from returning unused funds. "... Cost . . . ( is
considered) as a limit . . . , not as a guide to efficient
choice among alternatives and use of resources." 1 The
squadron's output, then, is a free resource available to
the operational command to fill its requirements. Because
this resource costs him nothing, and contributes to his
1QIbid . Contrast this analysis to Vice Admiral
George C. Dyer, Naval Logistics
,
(Annapolis: United States
Naval Institute, 1960), p. 17; "A "Requirement" doesn't
change . . . just because of a lack of resources to
support it."
11 Hitch, loc. cit.
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output, the commander "requires" the maximum amount
obtainable
.
Returning to the problem of the choice of the
maintenance organization's measure of effectiveness, the
organization must determine the output requirements on
which its superior operational command bases performance
evaluation. This is analogous to a board of directors
evaluating a firm's performance only on the basis of the
number of product units it produces, without considering
the firm's cost in producing the units. Profit, or the
difference between income and costs, is the measure of
effectiveness of the firm. If the maintenance officer
could view all of his inputs as free (i.e., had no costs
to consider) , as the controling operational commander does
he would have no problem. The question of the maintenance
officer's costs is considered at a later point.
Tasks of aviation units are always stated in terms
of flight time totals or completed flight mission totals.
Aviation units respond to this criterion rather than the
criterion of aircraft-available time because the incentives
imposed on the unit by the operational chain of command
are exceedingly more powerful than incentives from BUWEPS
or other sources. An aircraft ready to fly, but tied down
in a hanger bay, has no utility to the squadron except as
it will contribute to future successful missions. A
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strategy of not flying at all would optimize the maintenance
organization's record of aircraft-available time. In fact,
some maintenance organizations develop a resistance to
flight operations based on the feeling that operations are
"hurting" maintenance's record, as if the two functions
had divisible objectives. The maintenance organization
is successful only as the entire unit is successful.
When measuring the effect of alternate policies on his
system's output, the maintenance officer is obliged to use
operational objectives as his best measure. Perhaps if
BUWEPS wrote his fitness report instead of an operational
commander, this would not be true.
The choice between "aircraft-available time" and
"flight-time" would be unimportant if, the two were
empirically correlated. The writer's experience has been
that they are not correlated and the maintenance officer
can waste a lot of energy chasing the wrong index. There
are several ways that the maintenance officer can improve
his "availability" record without improving the unit's
flight time output; juggling the flight schedule and
winking at inaccurate reports are examples. More serious
is the incentive for resisting flight operations that the
"aircraft-available" index creates by insulating the main-
tenance department from the organization's objectives. A
situation common to carrier aviation operations illustrates
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the point well. Maintenance work typically is generated
in "lumps" because several aircraft must operate together
and, therefore, return together. To optimize "aircraft-
availability", the aircraft that do not require repair
work, only fueling and other servicing, would receive
priority attention because they can be made "available"
soonest. But, if the maintenance officer desires to
provide the maximum number of ready aircraft for the next
scheduled launch, priority is assigned to the aircraft
needing the most extensive repair that may possibly be
completed in time for the launch. The more certain that
an aircraft will be ready on time, the more slack its
priority will be. This policy is much more difficult to
use because maintenance crews must be shifted between
aircraft often and this complicates work scheduling.
A second reason why the two indices loosely correlate
springs from the complexity of modern aircraft. A signifi-
cant percentage of aircraft reported "up" by maintenance
develop trouble before being launched. Maintenance cannot
check each of the aircraft's systems before releasing it
for flight; reported troubles are repaired and it is assumed
that the aircraft is available for flight. Often there
are checks and precautions that could be made by main-
tenance personnel that would reduce the number of undis-
covered discrepancies that later prevented launch. Use of
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these checks and precautions is discouraged if the main-
tenance function is measured by "aircraft-available"
statistics.
The case for using flight time as the measure of
effectiveness of the maintenance organization can be
summarized as follows: It is a statistic that is easy
to acquire. It is the measure of effectiveness used by
superior operational commands to judge the unit's perfor-
mance. It encourages the maintenance function to adopt
the objectives of the organization as its own. It is the
best index available for making unit objectives compatible
with high level objectives of military worth, readiness,
etc., assuming that flight time is a good measure of the
degree of training of pilots and maintenance crews and of
the physical condition of aircraft. The greatest failing
of flight time as a criterion is that it ignores costs.
This impinges on national objectives—the real cost of the
last hour of flight time may be more than its military
worth to the nation. The nation's costs are different




The operational aviation maintenance system is
distinguished most by the rigidity of the inputs available
to the maintenance officer. The activity organization
has been designed to minimize the manager's discretion in
varying inputs into his system. In theory, the maintenance
organization should be able to "run itself". The personnel
and aircraft allowances are fixed and take years to change;
the technology and procedures used by the organization
are given in detail and prescribe exactly the material
and tools to be used; and the intensity of operations is
determined by the flight schedule prescribed by the unit's
operational command. Who needs a maintenance officer?
Human Resources . A closer look indicates, however,
that there are areas of flexibility in inputs that allow
the maintenance officer to affect the unit's performance.
The first of these is the human resources available to
him. The number of personnel assigned and their prior
training are largely beyond the control of the maintenance
officer, but the manhours expended by the work force and
cheir current training are controllable. Human resources
contribute effort and skill to the organization's output.
Too many Navy and industrial managers consider the crew's
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effort the only variable human resource output available
and ignore the possibilities for increasing skill. For
1 Pinstance, a Northrop Corporation study fc indicates that
employees' effort has the greatest impact on a company's
human resources output. The study concluded that "im-
proving employee effort" offered as much opportunity for
savings as "improving mechanical methods" and "reducing
idle time" combined. This paper, however, will not
consider the employee effort problem for two reasons:
First, the study of motivation of human effort has
occupied the attention of military managers for a very
long time. Both the problems of motivation and techniques
for accomplishing it are the subject of leadership.
Certainly, the study of leadership can still pay dividends
to the Navy manager, but there are other areas just as
profitable which have been largely ignored.
The second reason why this paper will not consider
the problem of effort is because the Navy pattern of
motivational systems is fixed, it is reasonably successful,
and it is not available for change during the short run.
By "motivational systems" is meant the Navy's procedures
and tradition for performance evaluation, pro.no tion, pay,
12Northrop Corporation, "PACE Manual" (Beverly
Hills: Northrop Corporation, 1959), p. 1-3-
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rank structure, etc. An officer faced with the problem of
improving a particular operation cannot expect to "be able
to change these systems, though he may have influence in
long run improvement of them.
But, the skill of the maintenance officer's human
resources also contributes to his output. Like sobriety,
everyone speaks well of training but finds that it just
doesn't fit their circumstances. Effort and skill can be
largely substituted for each other and probably the costs
of increased skill, in most organizations, are much less
than the costs of increased effort, for the same return in
output. More training, then, can have a higher payoff than
more leadership or motivation from the same human resources.
yvork Methods . Work methods of the maintenance
organization have a major influence on output and are
often under the maintenance officer's control. Two
categories of work methods must be recognized. First, there
are the methods that generally are the subject of indus-
1 3trial motion and time study. ^ The maintenance officer
has very little knowledge of, or control of, the specific
motions that constitute the tasks of the various technical
ratings of personnel assigned to him. Whether this
1
^Ralph M. Barnes, Motion and Time Study (fourth
edition; New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), chapter
3 describes the types of studies in which time and motion
study techniques are useful.
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arrangement is the best possible, or not, the maintenance
officer does not often involve himself in how to pull an
aircraft engine or disassemble a generator, for instance.
The maintenance officer can help his performance by
arranging training that improves his crew's knowledge of
the prescribed methods for technical tasks, but the
methods are rigidly controlled by BUWKPS (through technical
manuals and directives and the training of enlisted ratings)
and are not available for change by the maintenance officer.
This fact has considerable meaning when comparing the
function of the aviation maintenance officer with that of
the standard industrial activity manager. This means that
time and motion study techniques, a subject of elemental
importance to the industrial manager, have almost no
utility to the maintenance officer. Undoubtedly, many of
the methods prescribed by BUWEPS could be improved by time
and motion study, but the maintenance officer does not
find it profitable to expend a major effort for this
purpose because his influence on task methods is small.
A second category of work methods, however, is
under the maintenance officer's control. Though he accepts
how the task will be performed as given, he controls when
and where the task is performed, and by whom. The types
of methods he can control include personnel utilization,
scheduling, work flow, procedures for inter-task
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coordination, and support functions. In this area many of
the supervisory tools associated with industrial management
are useful to the maintenance officer. Gantt Charts for
work scheduling and check lists for standardization and
14
work analysis are commonly used by maintenance activities.
Work analysis techniques such as flow diagrams and process
charting are less commonly used by maintenance activities,
but could be profitably employed. The Work Study Group,
Pacific, used work flow diagrams in designing the layout
of the Lemoore Naval Air Station Maintenance Department
Tire Shop with excellent results.'^ Process charting of
functions such as material requisitioning and sequencing
of the elements of periodic aircraft checks offers the
1 f>
maintenance officer major improvement of his procedures.
The construction of methods for controlling the activity's
work scheduling, process flow, and personnel utilization
is a major input to the aviation maintenance function,
and it is a variable that the maintenance officer can control,
1
^Marvin E. Mundel, Motion and Time Study , Principles
and Practice (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955) , PP. 36,
142, 181-82, provides examples of uses of check lists in
work analysis.
'^Pacific Fleet Work Study Group, "Aircraft Main-
tenance Department, NAS Lemoore, California" (Fleet Work
Study Report No. 9A, NA3 Lemoore, 1961 ).
1
"Barnes, ojd. cit
. , chapter 5-
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Unlimited "Free Goods " . A third aviation maintenance
input is the consumable material that the maintenance
department draws directly from the Navy supply system.
These material include repair parts, hand tools, lubricants,
general supplies, and fuel. Within broad limits, the
maintenance officer may view this material as a free input;
he is not bothered by a scarcity of this material. Activity
budgets of funas to pay for this material (except repair
parts, for which he has no budget) are based on average
cost per flight hour. Since fuel costs dominate the hourly
average, changes in maintenance expenditures can only
slightly affect the budgeted funds. Almost any tradeoff
of this class of material for manhours that is technically
available to the maintenance officer will be profitable to
him. As a rule, the squadron does not pay a cost or
penalty for using this material until its usage becomes
significantly higher than expenditures of other squadrons
operating the same type of aircraft. When comparisons
between units are difficult, because the aircraft is new
to the fleet or operating conditions for one unit are
unique, the maintenance officer's freedom for expenditure
variation is increased. Similarly, there is practically
no incentive for reducing expenditures. The unit that
attempts to improve its performance rating by conserving
material of this class must make extremely large reductions
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to distinguish itself, and often gives the impression that
it is not performing functions that it should be performing.
Within the institutional restraints on the issue of this
class of material (i.e., "turn in one to get one"), the
maintenance officer can use this material in any manner
that optimizes the output of his scarce resources such as
aircraft or personnel. Probably, very few tradeoffs using
this class of material will remain available to the
organization at any one time because most units operate
at the technical limit of exchange. Most people in the
organization understand and recognize this type of
opportunity very well.
Limited Allowance "Free Goods ". The fourth class
of inputs to the maintenance function is semi-fixed capital
equipment, such as ground handling equipment, maintenance
spaces, and heavy shop equipment. Items of this sort are
intended to be controlled by rigid formulas that guarantee
equal treatment of all units. Usually the item is issued
and controlled by an air station or other service activity
not in the unit's chain of command. Many maintenance
officers find, however, that negotiation or friendship can
often bend these rigid controls. 1 7 For instance, effective
^Hitch & McKean, op_. cit
. , p. 164, comment on the
use of negotiation, "cooperation and coordination" as a re-
placement for a market mechanism to gain efficiency in the
distribution of resources in the government.

23
documentation of a "need" for additional hydraulic jacks
or other support equipment will often gain the equipment
for one unit while undocumented needs in other units re-
main unfilled. Also, the interpretation of issue formulas
is often negotiable and offers the maintenance officer
opportunity to increase his input of this class of equip-
ment. Services performed for the unit by support activities,
such as repair parts delivery and Class A, B, and C level
heavy maintenance services, can often be expanded by the
maintenance officer if he carefully interprets the directives
that control these services. Very often ground handling
equipment, and other items of this class, can be substi-
tuted for a significant number of manhours . tfhere this
opportunity is available, the maintenance officer can
realize an important increase to flight hour output, or
reduce the crew's work effort, by effective negotiation.
Obviously, increased utilization of equipment of this
class assigned to the unit has the same effect as obtaining
additional items. Maintenance and scheduling procedures
for the equipment will effect their utilization. The
design of these procedures can be considered part of the
work methods input discussed above.
The Limiting Resource
. The last system input is
fixed in quantity and extremely difficult to change. This
is the number of assigned aircraft, the most important

24
asset the maintenance officer has. Very dramatic changes
in output could be realized if he had control of aircraft
assignment. Its importance justifies very close survaillence
of the unit's on-board count versus allowance and any
opportunity to increase aircraft will pay significant
dividends. The aircraft assignment determines the range
of output within which the most efficient and least efficient
maintenance officer must operate. As a rule, though, the
maintenance officer cannot influence these allowances and





After considering the types of inputs into the
aviation maintenance system, we are now in a position to
discuss the costs of these inputs. In this context, the
cost of any particular input to the individual organization
can be quite different from the cost of the same input to
the Navy Department. "Most of the cost of poor decisions
does not fall on those who make them. The incentive to
seek profitable innovations and efficient methods is not
1 ft
a strong one." 0 Higher level costs will be discussed
below.
Costs are "... those negative effects (of an
action) which we like to decrease." " The maintenance
officer's only significant costs are human resources. The
word "morale" is often used to describe the work force's
long-term productivity to the organization and to the
Navy. "Morale", however, is concerned only with long-
term effort and does not include the long term conse-
quences of training or the failure to train. The negative
consequences on later skill and effort as a result of the
^McKean, ojd. cit., p. 8.
1 Q^Hitch and McKean, op_. cit
. , p. 165.
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maintenance officer's actions are the only costs which the
organization pays.
Consider the nature of inputs into the organization
as that organization views them. Fuel and spare parts are
essentially free; there are no repercussions to the organ-
ization for any changes in consumption, within broad limits.
Allowance list items such as heavy equipment, working
spaces, aircraft, etc., though difficult to increase, cost
the organization nothing. It cannot receive a "gain" by
returning any of these items and does not suffer if it is
able to increase its input of them above the set level.
Since the unit loses nothing and usually can gain something
by increases, it logically must continually press for more.
This is not true of the human resources categories. In-
creased use of these must be paid for from within the
unit. The maintenance officer cannot pay a bonus or over-
time for greater effort from his crew. The same is true
of work method changes that disrupt the crew's habits or
disturb the security of their work routines. Training
costs the organization immediate output with the expecta-
tions that later output will be greater. In summary, the
manner in which human resources are used in any time
period by the organization produces consequences for the
organization in several other time periods which must be
recognized. The use of all other resources has
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consequences for a single time period only.
Admittedly, human resources costs are very difficult
to measure. Many Navy managers are able to defer this
cost for long periods. Authoritative control of the crew
can effect his productivity, but, if no sooner than the
expiration of enlistment, the unit pays sooner or later
in undeveloped skills, disciplinary problems, and
uninspired willingness to work. All organizations are
evaluated by these types of records to some extent. It
is important to the maintenance officer to carefully
consider the manner in which his organization is evalu-
ated on this cost when he is formulating operational
strategy. Increasingly, superior commands are providing
considerable incentive for their unit's to demonstrate
increasing reenlistment rates and decreasing disciplinary
cases. If these things have real value to the unit in
terms of its performance rating, then the unit can con-
sider trading flight time output to gain them. Often,
however, the unit rating cannot be improved more, once it
has attained a certain level of reenlistment, for instance,
and diverting resources from flight time output to further
improve the unit's reenlistment rate is a waste of re-
sources. Since reenlistment and discipline indices do
not directly measure morale, they exhibit a range of ran-
domness which is extremely costly to control. Also, the

28
crew's willingness to produce is not fully measured by
these two records. Often, present flight time can be
profitably reduced to increase the crew's long term pro-
ductivity without being reflected in the reenlistment and
discipline records. Superior commands attempt to evaluate
this factor with Administrative/Material Inspections and
other forms of audit, but with limited success.
It was suggested in the discussion of a proper
measure of effectiveness for aircraft maintenance organ-
izations that "flight time" or "completed missions" should
be used. The unit's "cost" of human resources argues
against this measure by itself. At some point the gain
of additional flight time is not worth its cost to the
organization in future skill and effort. If the main-
tenance officer could somehow reduce human resource costs
and flight time to a common unit of measure, he could use
the difference between the two as a measure of the
desirability of different courses of action. If a policy
under consideration added more to flight time than it cost
in human resources, it would be profitable to use that
20policy. Under the present incentive system, then, the
maintenance officer's problem is the impossible one of
finding an accurate measure of human resources costs and




But the effort to define this problem has not "been
wasted for several reasons. First, the concept of the
maintenance organization as an integral system with a
single, measurable output can be extremely valuable for
evaluating alternative policies and procedures. The con-
cept provides a filing system of categories in which
effects of plans being considered can be sorted.
Secondly, many alternatives arise which affect
21
either flight time or human resources, but not both.
If the maintenance officer can increase the crew's skill
without reducing flight time output, by a procedural
change, the organization gains on balance. In the other
direction, an opportunity to increase flight time, without
requiring the crew to exert more effort, is a very easy
decision. More often, though, alternatives that will in-
crease flight time also increase human costs. There is a
broad range of this type alternative that is not a problem
because the difference in magnitude of gain and costs is
large and easy to judge. Inescapably, however, problems
arise in which the net gain of proposed alternatives is
difficult to determine. It is important for the main-
tenance officer to realize that his difficulty is a result




resources. The effect of his decision on this cost, and
on flight time output, should he the core of his analysis.
No other considerations can be more revelant to the
organization's performance than these.

CHAPTER V
PREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR OP THE ORGANIZATION
The discussion above has tried to ignore the
multiple variations of incentive climates that aviation
organizations encounter and distill the organizational
pressures that are common to all. All organizations are
influenced by BUWEPS maintenance material requisition
procedures and standard operational controls that con-
tribute to the incentive structure that determines the
organization's behavior. Specific organizations must
live with other influences that are peculiar to its
organization. If the air group commander writes his
squadron Commanding Officers' fitness reports with the
Happy Hour Attendance Record or "Alfa" fund expenditure
records before him, then, obviously, the squadron is well
advised to trade a little flight time for Club time or
efforts toward holding down administrative expenses.
But, it is impossible to generalize on this type of per-
formance criteria except to recognize that it exists.
One other influence commonly observed in organization
behavior that has been ignored by the discussion above is
the maintenance officer's sense of duty to broad Navy
interest and not just the interests of his organization.
Again, it is only possible to recognize that this influence
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exists in most organizations. Since variation in the
strength of the influence and individual interpretation
of "the interest of the Navy" is so wide, it is fruitless
to attempt to generalize on its impact on organizational
behavior. Consider the problem of spare aircraft wheels
and tires held by a squadron. Supply directives state
that squadrons will not keep any spare wheels and tires
in their possession, outside the supply facility, because
this greatly multiplies the inventory costs of these items.
The squadron gains an occasional extra hour of flight
time by having spare wheels and tires available right
on the flight line instead of in the auxiliary store in
the hanger. The "interests of the Navy" appear to be
served by not keeping spares on the flight line, but it
costs the squadron nothing to exchange the wheels and
tires of a stricken aircraft, for instance, for good
spares that can save hurried twenty minute trips to the
store. Maintenance officers see their duty to turn in
spares in different ways. Some units will hold none;
others will hold enough to optimize flight time, but not
enough to optimize the convenience of the crew. A few
will hold as many as it can get until the quantity be-
comes a nuisance to the crew.
It is suggested that the assumption an organization
will not behave as if motivated by broad national or
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service interests is very useful when designing information
or control systems. This assumption implies that the
organization usually behaves as if optimizing its own
interests as determined by the incentives it faces. If
the design of a control system can align the objectives
of the system with the interests of the organization, it
will be much more effective than if the system establishes
special incentives or relies on a "sense of duty" to the
Wavy
.
There are a great many control systems in use in
aviation organizations that are based on special incen-
tives other than the operational objectives of the unit.
Enlisted promotion examinations and correspondence courses,
leadership programs, safety programs, and service infor-
mation programs are examples. These systems cost the
squadron effort, but do not contribute to its worth directly.
The high rate of personnel turnover in the organization
encourages the organization to evaluate its own actions
ana alternatives on a short term basis, usually two to
three years. Actions which have a payoff longer than
this period will not be undertaken by the organization
without special penalties or rewards High level author-
ities that judge a particular system to have long range
worth, then, must create special incentives to control
the organization's behavior in the manner desired. It is
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very difficult to judge the proper strength of special in-
centives to elicit the exact behavior desired and not
create unexpected spillover effects on the unit's primary
objective. The problem is avoided if the system can be
designed to contribute to the organization's worth.
In addition to long range objectives, special in-
centives are used by higher authorities to express their
judgement of the short range worth of particular actions.
An organization seeking to optimize the difference be-
tween flight time and its human resources costs will seek
an ACCP rate or accident rate, for instance, that optimizes
this value. As an example, the organization will tend to
find a level of support equipment preventative maintenance
or aircraft cleanliness that balances flight time gain
and effort cost. If higher authority determines that this
balance is, in fact, a poor solution to optimize the
organization's worth, it must use a special incentive to
change the organization's behavior. Many times, where
objectives extraneous to the organization are not involved,
the organization will generally produce a very good bal-
ance, and higher authority often prescribes an inferior
one. Thus, arbitrary work uniform regulations and work
space cleanliness standards must often be renegotiated to
a more "reasonable" level.
If aviation maintenance units operate under
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the conditions described above, the maintenance officer
will replace labor with fuel, repair parts, or any other
free resource until he has exhausted the prescribed
budgets available to him or until no other possibilities
for substitution are available. Because he must later
"pay" for the way in which he uses his human resources,
the maintenance officer profits from any procedure that
reduces his crew's effort or increases their skill by
using more of the "free" resources available. Further,
since some resources, though free, are limited (supfort
equipment, aircraft, etc.), the maintenance officer will
profit from always using the full amount of these resources
available to him. For example, he will always requisition
the maximum quantity of support equipment available to
him, as long as the last piece of equipment he received
has positive value. Similarily, he will substitute less
limited resources for more limited resources when this is
technically possible.
22M. W. Hoag, "The Relevance of Costs in Operations
Research" (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1956),
P-820, p. 11, cites an example of a military commander that
used coffee as a sweeping compound because the allotment
from which he bought coffee was loose while the allotment
from which he bought sweeping compound was tight. If he
was overallocated coffee to the point that it had to be
thrown out, use as a sweeping compound is an "efficient"
use of coffee. Probably the commander could not even
guess at the relative costs (to the government) between
compound and coffee—both were "free goods".
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The design of a price-budget system for operational
units has recently received much attention in the Navy.
It appears certain that before long a new accounting
system ^ will be installed, designed to identify all
24
expenditures incurred by operational organizations. The
question of the system's success in encouraging efficiency
is not solved by simply identifying all expenditures,
however. The word "efficiency" is often used in the
military to mean the absence of redundancy or waste of
resources used toward an objective. The concept of
"efficiency" should include the mix of resources used.
Efficiency in the mix of resources used by operational
units has been defeated in the past by allowance lists
which control the issue of each item independent of all
other items. The "true" cost of an item to a unit is what
must be foregone to obtain the item. The maintenance
officer is very limited in his ability to exchange types
of resources. He is assigned a specific number of tow
bars and hydraulic jacks. He cannot forego a few jacks
in order to get more tow bars as he could if he were in
^Department of Defense Instruction 7040.1.
?4^Hoag, loc . clt . , argues that any cost index has
problems, but that "estimated money costs" is the "least
unsatisfactory" base for costing military operations (vs
manhours or other "real terms").
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the market place. This lack of substitutability is what
causes the maintenance officer to view his resources as
"free goods". If he had available a money budget from
which he had to purchase all of his resources, he would
not "buy" more jacks if tow bars were more valuable to
him. The cost to the organization of an item purchased
would be determined by the utility of the other items it
is necessary to forego. If the unit can afford either
jacks or tow bars, and buys more tow bars, their value
is the jacks it must do without. Under an item allowance
system, the maintenance officer can choose only between
"jacks" and "no jacks" and, unless he already has so many
that more of them would only be a bother, he will invariably
draw the jacks. If the faults of the "free goods" system
are to be corrected, improvement must start by increasing
the maintenance officer's options for substituting between
resources.
A great many military writers have bemoaned the
tendency to centralize decision making at successively
higher levels in the service hierarchy. They argue that
the local commander is in the best position to determine
his "needs" and can therefore provide the most efficient
solution to the resource mix for accomplishing its tasks. 2 -*
2
^J. H. Garrett, "Characteristics of Usage of
Supply Items Aboard Naval Ships and the Significange to
Supply Management" (ftavy Management School paper, Monterey,
California, 1961), p. 12.
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This argument for decentralized decision-making is essen-
tially the same argument made in the previous paragraph.
It is valid if two assumptions are valid: first, the
decentralized authority evaluates the costs of the re-
sources he uses in the same manner and over the same time
period that higher level authorities value the same re-
sources. Second, the decentralized authority views his
objective in the same way as higher level authorities.
Obviously, neither of these assumptions is entirely valid
and the problems involved in making them valid do not have
any easy solutions. Further, military commanders have
tended to view the advantages of decentralized authority
as ending at their particular level in the hierarchy.
Thus, fleet commanders insist that they should control
their air logistic support, but accept the "fact" that they
must ration the use of that support by subordinate ships
and other units. 'The argument for decentralized authority
is valid down to the lowest production center, but the
25Hitch, op_. cit .
, p. 21. "Criteria at decentralized
decision levels "(should relate)
. . . with incentives and
information at the same levels. It does little good to
ask a subordinate official to maximize a function requiring
data he cannot get, or one that runs counter to his self-
interest. . . . Incentives, as in the market economy, can
make or break any plan."
2?Garrett, cjo. cit., p. 17. "It seems a perfect
analogy (to decentralized business management) to me to look
upon a task fleet commander as the very highest point at





problems incurred because of "proximate criteria" for
measuring costs and stating objectives multiply at each
level as authority is pushed down into the hierarchy.
2%cKean, oja. cit . , chapter 2, "The Criteria Problem."
i.e. "Proximate criteria" for translating words like "optimum"
"adequate", and "minimum possible" into observable outcomes.

CHAPTER VI
CONTROL OP PERSONNEL UTILIZATION
It has "been pointed out that the maintenance officer's
only costs are in human resources (the only resource which,
when used, has later undesired consequences for the organ-
ization). Also, personnel is the only resource with which
the maintenance officer has a degree of freedom to deter-
mine the manner in which it is utilized. For both of
these reasons the maintenance officer has a strong interest
in an information system that will give him useful infor-
29
mationof how his crew is being utilized. This appears
to be the purpose of the Manhour Accounting System of
BUWEPS Instruction 5440.2-^ This system requires all
shop supervisors to account for the working hours of their
crew by specified categories of productive and non-pro-
31ductive time. This data is compiled for the entire de-
partment and displayed to the maintenance officer to
29Appendix D distinguishes between a performance
evaluation information system and a personnel utilization
information system.
•^Bureau of Naval Weapons Instruction 5440.2 dated
23 September 1958. Section G, Manhour Accounting is
reproduced as Appendix B.




. . . planning and workload scheduling; in man
power distribution; in pointing out time consuming
practices, especially in non-productive areas, and
in providing a basis for justifying realistic per-
sonnel allowances .^2
These functions correspond to the "work methods"
input to the maintenance function discussed earlier.
Appendix B is a reproduction of Section G, Manhour
Accounting of the BUWEPS Instruction and Appendix C is a
criticism of several aspects of the system.
The Manhour Accounting system appears to suffer
most from one inaccurate implied assumption. It assumes
that the work or job of each man and each shop is "carved
in cement"; that is, the proper function and output of
each man is (or can be) predetermined and the purpose of
an information system is to merely indicate to the main-
tenance officer where humans are not performing "as they
should". In his criticism of "Classical" Organization
Theory, Simon says "to understand the formal theory, it
is important to recognize that the total set of tasks is
regarded as given in advance. "33 Exactly the same
weakness appears in the concept of Manhour Accounting.
Even with an accounting report of great accuracy before
32Appendix B, p. 45.
-^March & Simon, op_. cit
. , p. 23,
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him, the maintenance officer is still stuck with the prob-
lem of determining where his figures vary from what "should
he" and what "should be" done to correct the variance.
If an information system is to assist the main-
tenance officer in the utilization and control of his
personnel, it must face up to the fact that the maintenance
function is extremely random and largely undefined as to
subfunctions that must be performed. Every new aircraft
shifts the functions of at least some of the technical
ratings assigned to the department. A newly formed
squadron, with a new type aircraft, spends most of its
training period deciding what functions will be performed
by what shops or ratings. Aviation ratings have expanded
and contracted wildly during the past few years as new
aircraft change the functions performed within the main-
tenance organization. Similiarly, the random nature of
aircraft systems discrepancies makes predetermined
functional assignments extremely difficult. The "proper"
personnel allowance for the ordnance shop, for instance,
is Impossible to determine until the organization has
generated some experience with the weapons systems of its
aircraft, flying specified missions.
The Manhour Accounting System, then, has failed to
be useful to any maintenance officer because it was designed
to be used by all of them. Since the functions performed
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vary widely between organizations, it is impossible to
develop a universal set of observation categories that
will have meaning for all units. The industrial engineering
literature concerned with work analysis suggests that in-
dustrial firms have encountered the same problem. "Very
definite specifications are generally laid down for de-
tails of observation, but only vague specifications for
data analysis."-' There is no theory of work that will
apply to all work situations, so work study theorists,
unable to generalize on work analysis, have been limited
to developing intricate mechanical techniques for gathering
data to be used after the objectives of the particular
study have been given. The work of Heiland and Richardson, ^
as an example, is the best known exposition of the work
sampling technique for work study. They handle the prob-
lem of the way in which work sampling can be used in this
language
:
The preceding uses of Work Sampling are expressed
in broad terms. This is done in order that in the
setting of objectives of Work Sampling, the uses may
serve as suggestions and as a guide, rather than as
a "cookbook" set of rules. Each situation in which
the technique is applied is different. However,
those applying Work Sampling are much better situated




^Robert E. Heiland and Wallace J. Richardson,
Work Sampling (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957)
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needs. In addition, those on the scene must live with
the results, and should choose objectives which are,,-
practical to the particular activity to be studied.
Ignoring the experience of industrial analysts,
the Manhour Accounting System not only defines the technique
for aviation maintenance work studies, but also attempts
to define the studies' objectives by prescribing the work
categories to be observed.
If the above analysis is correct, BU/TEPS could
improve the Manhour Accounting System by making it a simple
technique for studying any work problem and allowing the
unit maintenance officer to define his own problems on
which the technique is used.-^'
This, would involve providing the maintenance
officer with a capability for making work studies, re-
placing the Manhour Accounting System, and accepting the
fact that the usefulness of this capability, to both the
maintenance officer and higher authorities, depends entirely
on the nature of the problems in his organization. The
best technique for studying work problems in randomly





37This is the stated purpose of HQ-USMC, "Local
Command Work Measurement" (Vol I of "Management Improve-
ment Handbook", NAVMC 1088-ADM (Revised), 1954). It suffers
from a common failing of Work Measurement Systems by




scene is Work Sampling. One or two people in the Planning
Division with a basic understanding of the principles
underlying statistical sampling and some training in the
methods of making random observations and compiling the
data gathered would give the maintenance officer a Work
Sampling capability.-^ Considering that the present
system costs the time of every supervisor in the depart-
ment, work sampling would be inexpensive and could pro-
vide very superior data.
Probably an early objection to this system would
be that the data of different maintenance organizations
would be impossible to standardize for use by higher
authorities. There are two reasons why this objection
is irrevelant to the problem. First, the data being
produced now by the Manhour Accounting System is useless
to authorities higher than the maintenance organization
because it is not related to real problems in the organ-
ization. Second, standardization between organizations
is not an end in itself, but is assumed to contribute to
the missions and objectives assigned to subordinate
organizations. Maintenance organizations are controlled
by an incentive system that operates through the flight
^8
^ He i land and Richardson, ojd. cit
. ,
provides an





time objectives assigned to the organization. The organ-
ization's interest in a "correct" work study system depends
on the utility the organization sees in the system.
Standardization does not have value for either the main-
tenance organization or higher authorities when it does






The maintenance Officer interested in im-
proving his organization's output can accomplish this by
either increasing his budget of inputs or improving the
efficiency of current input use. Because most inputs do
not have a later cost to the organization, efforts to
increase inputs generally are more rewarding than efforts
to increase efficiency. If authorities wish to encourage
voluntary increased efficiency in maintenance organizations
it is necessary that incentive changes be designed that in-
crease the cost of inputs to the organization. The study
of the organization's efficiency, then, involves the study
of its incentive system or the structure of its penalties
and rewards.
2. The primary positive output of the organization
is flight tine. Operational command rewards are metered
by the organization's success in completing flight time
missions. The strength of this incentive generally over-
whelms the numerous other special incentive systems pressed
on the organization. Special incentives for gains or
positive outputs other than flight time become significant
only when the organization reaches an extreme position.
Organizations adapt to special incentives by diverting
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enough of their output to the special objectives to avoid
extreme costs and view the possibilities for reward from
special incentives as less profitable than flight time
gain. Authorities outside the operational chain are in a
poor position to reward the organization and must rely on
punishment as incentive for special objectives unless they
are able to cause the operational chain to build the ob-
jectives into its incentive system. Thus, safety records,
to which operational commanders generally give close
attention, are much more sensitive than enlisted promotion
and training records, to which operational commanders give
attention only when the organization's performance is
extremely poor.
3. The negative consequences, present and future,
of using a resource in the current time period are what
the organization views as its costs for that resource.
Most of the organization's resources are cost free. Some
resources are limited, but, since the limited resources
cannot be inter-substituted, are still considered free by
the organization. Inefficient use of one limited resource
does not cost the organization flight time by reducing the
available quantity of another limited resource. Using
"too many" tow bars does not mean that the organization
will have "not enough" jacks or other equipment. Thus,
allowance lists remove the organization's incentive for
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efficient use of these resources by removing the negative
consequences of using them. Other resources such as fuel
and repair parts are not limited even "by allowance lists.
These may be consumed until their marginal contribution
to output is zero. What is used during the current time
period cannot have a negative consequence in later time
periods unless, perversely, "too little" is used currently
and this causes later budgets to be reduced.
4. Only one resource, when used, can have later
negative consequences, or costs, for the organization and
that is its human resources. Increased work hours now
can cause reduced effort later, or "too little" training
now can prevent increased skill later. If "later" is
more than two or three years, the current organization
will not view the consequence as a cost since the organ-
ization will be dissolved by then, but many human resources
costs fall due in less time than this. The military's
preoccupation with "leadership" to the exclusion of finan-
cial and material management theory is largely explained
by recognizing that the military organization's only costs
arise from its human resources. It is quite rational,
then, that the maintenance officer give extremely close
attention to the utilization of personnel and push aside
the problem of efficient utilization of other resources.
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5. There appear to be two routes to improved
efficiency in the maintenance organization:
a. Allow an all-wise "Solomon" to prescribe the
exact input of all resources into the organization, the
exact method in which they are combined, and the exact
output to be expected. This assumes that meaningful
exactness is attainable by the "Solomon" in all these
things and that subordinate organization managers are
able and willing to perform the mechanical function of
knowing what they are "supposed to know" and doing what
they are "supposed to do" without discretionary variance.
This makes the organization manager responsible, not for
output or performance, because the "Solomon" controls
this, but only for doing what he is told. The application
of this concept is marked by an increasingly detailed
stream of directives and control mechanisms from the
"Solomon", attempting to either explain or eliminate the
output variability caused by organizations with human
"weaknesses"
.
b. Design organization incentive systems that
align subordinate production input and output costs and
gains with higher authority valuations of the same factors.
If both evaluate the costs of resources used in the same
manner and view objectives in the same way, the problem
of subordinate control disappears. The incentive system

51
itself makes the subordinate his own strongest critic of
poor performance. The subordinate organization adapts to
changing external conditions more quickly and more accur-
ately than a higher authority can compute a new solution
to the same problem. This concept is the familiar argu-
ment for making governmental organizations more "business-
like" by introducing the "profit motive" to non-market
oriented managers.
Both of these routes to improved efficiency have
demonstrated weaknesses in application. The "Solomon"
never proves to be as wise as necessary and excuses his
shortcomings by pointing out the failures of subordinate
organizations in following his directions. He invariably
has a "poor group" working for him. The "profit-motive"
is effective for the production center manager given this
incentive, but there are always smaller production centers
below this manager which do not have this incentive. A
decentralized incentive system may operate to control the
Air Group Commander and leave the Air Frames Shop Super-
visor under a "Solomon" allocation system. The advantages
of decentralization are applicable at all levels, but the
lowest level at which it is profitable is exceedingly
difficult to define.
6. The previous discussion has not attempted to
design an improved incentive system for maintenance
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organizations, but only describe the system as it is
presently and point out alternate conceptual possibilities.
The importance of personnel utilization control to the
maintenance officer is evident from the unique character
of human resources in the organization. Personnel resources
utilization, alone, offers both significant incentive for
efficiency and opportunity for decentralized decision
making under the present incentive system. The Manhour
Accounting System of BUWEPS Instruction 5440.2 is a first
attempt to give the maintenance officer a quantitative
information system for controlling personnel utilization.
It is suggested that:
a. An analysis of the field use of the System
will show that is has very little value to maintenance
officers. By attempting to report on all possible prob-
lem areas, the System fails to give the maintenance officer
any useful data.
b. An information system that attempted only to
give a technique for work study, leaving problem form-
ulation to the individual maintenance officer, would be
considerably more valuable than the present Manhour
Accounting System. Industrial Work Sampling is adaptable
to most organization sizes and problems. It appears to
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1. PURPOSE. A manhour accounting sys-
tem is prescribed in this manual in order
that the Fleet may realize the maximum
benefit from a standard organization. The
organization of any enterprise is but one
link in the chain of management control
necessary to a comprehensive and inte-
grated attack on ^he causes of waste and
ineffectiveness. The manhour accounting
system gives the Aircraft Maintenance
Officer the facts that he needs to chart his
course toward better availability of air-
craft at lower costs of operation. Systems
to provide a control of manhour expendi-
ture have been strongly recommended by
the General Accounting Office and directed
by the Department of Defense for many
areas of government operations
, including
maintenance operations. Similar opera-
tions in Fleet Aircraft Maintenance De-
partments are not considered to be an
exception.
2. DISCUSSION. The manhour accounting
system, described in the following para-
graphs, is a technique used to control and
forecast personnel utilization. Informa-
tion obtained through this technique aids
in planning and workload scheduling; in
manpower distribution; in pointing out
time-consuming practices especially in
non-productive areas, and in providing
a basis for justifying realistic personnel
allowances
.
In order to control personnel activity,
it is necessary to obtain reports relative
to all personnel in their daily activities.
The reports should cover major manhour
areas that are indicative of how the ac-
tivity's manpower effort is distributed and
that are also indicative of the reason for
such a distribution. These reports are
summarized into a weekly report of hours
and percentages showing the distribution
of the manhours. Sample summaries are
provided to reveal the purposes of the
system and their value to all levels of
management.
3. DESIGN OF THE SYSTEM. In design-
ing a manhour accounting system to ac-
complish desired results, the elaborate
mechanisms for checks and balances of
comprehensive systems for industrial op-
erations have been avoided. Conditions
peculiar to the military operation were
taken into consideration in this design
work along with the need for a maximum
of accuracy at a minimum of cost in time
in accumulating, reporting and summariz-
ing pertinent information. The system is
therefore tailor-made to fit the environ-
ment of Fleet Maintenance operations
providing a minimum of work categories
and a descriptive reporting sequence
showing how time was spent in these work
categories.
The elements of the system are a de-
scription of the significant manhour cate-
gories, a simple mechanism to account
for non-productive time, a daily report
that can be quickly and easily prepared,
and a consolidated report that reflects the
efforts of the Department on one sheet of
paper. Forms to accomplish the objec-
tives of the system include the Daily
Check-Out and Check-In Log, the Daily
Man-Hour Distribution Report and the
Consolidated Manhour Distribution Report.
4. DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM.
a. Definitions of Manhour Categories
Productive Work reflects all time
spent accomplishing the mission as-
signed to the organization. This work
can be performed on a hardware item,
such as aircraft, or can be performed
to support the hardware work. Such
support work would be planning, in-
spection, supervision, etc. The pro-
ductive categories are defined below.
Shop Maintenance reflects all time






Hangar Maintenance reflects all time
spent performing Class "E" mainte-
nance tasks.
Line Maintenance reflects all time
spent performing Class "F" mainte-
nance tasks.
Support of Maintenance Work re-
flects all time spent performing tasks
which are non-maintenance but which
are in support of the organization's
mission. Examples o£ such work are
supervision, planning, inspection,
cleaning up shop area, administrative
functions, etc. If a function, which is
in support of maintenance work, is per-
formed by a man while he is engaged in
the performance of a maintenance task,
such time is reflected under the main-
tenance task that he is performing.
Non-Productive Work reflects all
time spent during working hours which
do not accomplish or support the or-
ganization's mission. The time in-
curred under the Non-Productive Work
category is usually time over which the
supervisor has no authority or time
which the supervisor finds difficult not
to grant. A "Check-Out and Check-In
Log" should be utilized to account for
Non-Productive Work time. The four
categories of Non-Productive Work
time are defined below:
Delays reflect the idle time incurred
awaiting material deliveries,
awaiting work, standing-by waiting
for aircraft or any other reason
that may cause idle time. When
time is recorded as a Delay, an
entry should be made in the
"Check-Out and Check-In Log"




supervisor and many times higher
than the Aircraft Maintenance Of-
ficer. The "Check-Out and Check-
In Log" is utilized to account for
Military time. Examples of such




























Personal reflects the time incurred for
needs personal to the individual.
The supervisor, for various rea-
sons, usually finds it difficult not
to grant time for the individual to
attend to his personal needs. The
"Check-Out and Check-In Log" is
utilized to account for personal












Military reflects the time incurred be-
cause a man was discharging a re-
quirement imposed on him for
military reasons. Such time is
usually planned and controlled at
a level higher than the immediate
Leave and Special Liberty reflect the
time a man spends on Leave or
Special Liberty, but only that time
which falls during working hours
when the entire organization is




routine is observed during normal
working hours , the Leave or Special
Liberty time falling during that
period is used.
b. Daily Check-Out and Check-In Log:
The Check-Out and Check-In Log (Figure
XIV) is used to account for a man's time
when he is in the work area but for some
reason is idle. Thus the supervisor is
afforded the means to -account for aman's
whereabouts when he is away from the
work area as well as a means to document
the non-productive *time incurred. The
hours recorded in this log for each cate-
gory are transferred to the Daily Man-
hour Distribution Report (Figure XV),
thus showing the total hours of a full work-
ing day. To be effective, this log should
be mandatory, which will assure its usage
for recording non-productive time.
This log is the responsibility of the
supervisor responsible for authorizing
absences. He requires the individual to
fill in the log when the individual leaves
the work area or when the individual be-
comes idle, under the definition of delays.
Such entries are made by the man only
through the "time-in" column. The su-
pervisor extends all elapsed times to the
proper non-productive columns. For leave
or special liberty, the supervisor makes
the entries. Whenever a substantial por-
tion of the personnel are in a non-
productive status during the same inter-
val and for the same reason, the supervisor
makes the entry for the group showing
the number of men involved in lieu of
names. The extension to the proper
column is a combined figure. For ex-
ample, if ten men are involved and the
elapsed time is 15 minutes, the elapsed
time extended is 10 X 15, equivalent to 2
hours 30 minutes.
c. Daily Manhour Distribution Report .
Daily Manhour Distribution Reports
(Figure XV) are prepared each day and
submitted to the Planning Division where
all reports are compiled into a manage-
ment report as required by the Aircraft
Maintenance Officer. The echelon re-




be that organization level where the Check-
Out and Check-In Log is maintained. The
information for the Daily Manhour Distri-
bution Report can be obtained from the
suggested Check-Out and Check-In Log,
Work Orders, and various other forms
available to the supervisor. Group time
is entered on this report as line entry be-
low the names. It is important that the
supervisor responsible for this report
insures that the total time recorded equals
the number of hours which are available
to the activity for a work day. For ex-
ample, if the work day is from 0800 to
1600, and there are tenmen assigned, then
the total hours for a work day is eighty.
A separate report should be submitted for
those people required to work after normal
working hours. If utilized properly, this
report can be very beneficial to the super-
visor since he will see documented evi-
dence as to how his available manhours
were utilized. Knowing what is absorb-
ing his manhours, such as military time,
the supervisor would be able to prove that
his work effort would be higher if he had
less interference from outside sources.
d. Consolidated Manhour Distribution
Report . The Consolidated Manhour Dis-
tribution Report (Figure XVI) serves as a
management tool to give the Aircraft Main-
tenance Officer, his subordinates, and his
superiors an insight as to where the time
of the personnel of the Aircraft Mainte-
nance Department has been expended.
This report has been designed to realis-
tically portray conditions as they exist.
It indicates "trouble areas" and can be
the basis for corrective action. Further-
more analysis of comparable reports,
allows the Aircraft Maintenance Officer
to establish direct manhour goals or stand-
ards which he might consider desirable.
This report is intended to be flexible
in that the work categories can be in-
creased or condensed depending on needs
of the Aircraft Maintenance Officer. As
an example, the Consolidated Manhour
Distribution Report may indicate that much
non-productive time is spent for personal







DAILY CHECK-OUT AND CHECK-IN LOG





15 AUGUST 19 58
NAME REASON
TIME / / -* / «j /
y> / <*• / v / <*-
* / * / /A
/ c? / £ A'-
/ / / **j
/ OUT / IN / *>
Group - 9 men MUSTER 0800 0815 2:15
A.B. SMITH Awaiting Material 0825 0900 :35
J.M. MORRIS * LEAVE 0800 1600 8:00
A.V. BEE Sick Bay 0830 0945 1: 15
R.J. BROWN MORALE LECTURE 1000 1100 1:00
J. P. MANNING BANK 1005 1115 1:10
Group - 4 men NOON MEAL 1100 1200 4:00
Group - 5 men NOON MEAL 1200 1300 5:00
Group - 9 men MUSTER 1300 1315 2: 15
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"personal" work categories by subtitles
such as church, commissary, bank, barber
shop, etc. in order that more precise in-
formation may be furnished so that cor-
rective action might ultimately be taken.
5. RESULTS FROM THE SYSTEM. It is
desirable for the Aircraft Maintenance Of-
ficer to have complete 'control over the
conduct of work operations and the regu-
lation of work performance at subordinate
management levels in accord with his
mission and objectives. The Consolidated
Manhour Distribution Report acts as a
starting point in that it tells how many
direct hours of work were expended. The
next step for him is to develop a produc-
tion type report stating what was produced
for the hours spent. This becomes com
plicated in a Maintenance Department Ac-
tivity since most of the work is in the
nature of servicing, checking and adjusting
and cannot be associated with a product.
In cases like this, however, it is possible
to compare direct manhours spent on shop,
hangar, and line functions with certain
available flying data in order to determine
correlations between them. As an ex-
ample, if direct hours by maintenance
functions were graphed on a chart with
flying data such as number of flying hours,
number of flights and the number of air-
craft in custody of the activity, it might
show that there is a direct relationship
between the number of flights and the num-
ber of direct hours of line maintenance.
If such a relationship continued to be con-
stant, the Aircraft Maintenance Officer
could determine how many people should
work on line maintenance each day de-
pending on the number of flights to be
flown. He could also establish a standard
of work performance on "direct hours line
maintenance per aircraft flight" by which
he could measure future work per-
formance.
6. SUMMARY. It is recognized that the
proposed manhour accounting system fills
only a part of the requirements for effec-
tive management of an aircraft mainte-
nance department. Additional techniques
need to be developed to supplement the
information generated from manhour ac-
counting. Until formalized techniques are
issued, Aircraft Maintenance Officers are
urged to utilize the manhour information,
available through the above described
system, in showing correlations between
utilization of maintenance manhours and
a related operating program. Such cor-
relations will be very beneficial in work-
load scheduling, redistribution of man-
power effort, and in providing accurate
justifications for other management
decisions. In summary, manhour account-
ing is another step towards furnishing the
Aircraft Maintenance Officer with infor-
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A Criticism of the Manhour Accounting System
of BUWEPS Instruction 5440.2
The Manhour Accounting System of BUWEPS Instruction
5440.2 was introduced as a preliminary effort to give the
aircraft maintenance officer a tool for work analysis. Its
technique and objectives were tentative and incomplete.
The announced objectives of the system were only vaguely
considered in the hope that experience with it would
sharpen both technique and objectives . -^ This has not
occurred. The system has hardened into the abortive form
first prescribed in 1958. This form can be criticized
from several aspects:
System Objectives . The only specific objective
that 5440.2 announces for the system is to quiet a complaint
from the General Accounting Office that aviation main-
tenance activities do not have any method for estimating
the degree of utilization of personnel. This objective
had a very strong influence on the design of the system.
The system uses the accoutant's approach of recording
•^Bureau f Naval Weapons Instruction 5440.2 dated





one hundred percent of all personnel time in rigid, pre-
determined categories, in the manner of recording expendi-
tures against appropriation accounts. The information
needs of the unit manager require less detail than this
and much more flexibility. Information categories such
as "military time", over which the manager has little
control, require the same effort of data collection and
computation that critically important categories such
as "delay time" require. Many wasteful hours are spent
by Planning Division personnel trying to balance, exactly,
the individual shop reports against total manhours available
during a reporting period. For purposes of control the
manager is not interested in a definitive accounting of
every last working hour available to him; he could not
act on such extremely accurate information. He is inter-
ested in trends and significant changes in his operations.
The approach of the statitician is more fruitful for con-
trol purposes than the approach of the accountant.
^
Any system design suffers from a failure to adequately
consider the system's objectives and Manhour Accounting is
no exception. Instruction 5440.2 vaguely says that much
useful data is made available, but does not approach the
'Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the




problem of how to use the data. Is 65$ "productive time"
good or bad? If bad, how can it be improved? Where do
you look for possible improvements? These questions and
many others arise for the manager when he is confronted
with the Summary Sheet at the end of an accounting period.
Systems design should start with specific questions to be
answered and then move to techniques for getting answers
to these questions. Manhour Accounting appears to have
betn hatched from a feeling that some sort of work
measurement system was needed, but the particular needs of
individual managers were so varied that they could not be
considered in the system design. An information system
that does not answer specific questions must be generating
at least some useless information. If a work measurement
system is to be useful to a unit's management it must
consider that particular management's objectives for the
system. This means that it is patently impossible to
design a work measurement system that will be universally
useful to all unit managements.
Inaccuracy of Data . Manhour Accounting uses shop
supervisors to record the activities of personnel by the
categories of "productive" and "non-productive" time.
This technique produces errors in the basic data from
which manhour summaries are compiled. First, a bias error
is introduced because the shop supervisor has an interest
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in causing his reports to stay in line with the reports
from other shops. It is difficult to convince a super-
visor that a significant change in the percent of produc-
tive time he reports will not reflect unfavorably on his
performance. Since he cannot record all personnel time
as it occurs, most of the data recorded by the supervisor
is from memory at the end of the day, according to his
judgement of how his people were used that day. The
supervisor, no matter how conscientious he may be about
the accuracy of his report, cannot avoid having his
judgement affected by his knowledge of past reports and
percentages reported by other supervisors. This subtle
influence on all supervisors in the unit has the effect
of tending all utilization percentages toward constant
figures and dulling the sensitivity of manhour reports
to changes that occur within the unit. Since sensitivity
to changes is precisely what the manager requires for
control purposes, the usefulness of the system is
questionable.
The other major source of error in data is the
technique for gathering the data. Instruction 5440.2
prescribes check-out, check- in forms for recording the
time personnel are out of the area, along with the purpose
for being out of the area. Reliable information requires
that these forms be used faithfully by all personnel,
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without exception. Any large group of people can be relied
upon not to be faithful in observing such a requirement
without tight controls. Controls mean more time and
effort by other people that are also liable for errors,
so that the question of whether the value of the system
is worth its cost arises very quickly. The categories of
work effort other than "out-of-area" , such as "productive
hanger", "line", "supervision", etc., time, are recorded
by the shop supervisor in summary form, usually at the
end of the day. In addition to the bias that this intro-
uuces, as discussed above, the possibility for error in
estimating actual time spent in each category is consider-
able. In addition, there is no method available for
estimating the magnitude of the error. These two sources
of error, bias toward insensitive data and inaccuracies in
data gathering, leave the manager with an information
system that he knows is not precisely correct, though the
language of its reports pretends to be, and he is unable
to estimate the degree of inaccuracy in his information.
System Cost . The cost of Manhour Accounting can be
measured by the time supervisors spend gathering and com-
piling data. From the point of view of salary or value to
the mission of the unit, supervisor time is the most expen-
sive personnel cost the unit has. If we assume that shop
supervisors spend an average of half an hour per day or
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two hours per week, each, with their reports, the unit
with ten to fifteen supervisors is paying twenty plus
hours per week of prime supervisor time for the doubtful
information of Manhour Accounting. An additional unmeasur-
able cost of the system is its effect on supervisor's
morale and productivity. Many units find that shop super-
visors are not particularly keen on the value of the
system and their part in evaluating their own performance.
The moral problem of self interest versus honest reporting
caused by the system is resented by many supervisors.
Managerial Utility of the Data Generated . A useful
work measurement system should operate to highlight
exceptional situations in the unit's structure. An oper-
ation that is under control requires little of the manager's
attention; the manager is interested in knowing where his
operation is out of control. This is the familiar principle
of management by exception. To adapt this principle to an
information system, the system must be designed to optimize
its sensitivity to change and rapidly bring managerial
attention to change as it occurs. Manhour Accounting can
be criticized as insensitive in two respects. First, the
bias of shop supervisors that tends to cause basic data
from all shops to read the same, as discussed earlier.
Secondly, the form of reporting used by the system makes
changes difficult to spot. Individual shops usually
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summarize their data weekly and these summaries are used
to compile the monthly report that is routed to unit
managers. Any significant variations in productive time,
or any of the other categories of shop time, that occurred
during the month are usually hidden by the long time covered
by the report. The unit could have experienced considerable
fluctuation in productive time, both high and low, but the
monthly average would not even hint at this. Additionally,
the monthly report compiles its category percentages by
very large unit subdivisions. An "average" non-productive
time figure for the Hanger Division can conceal significant
differences between the rower Plants, Airframes, and
Avionics shops. Any operation can be made to appear
stable and uniform if large enough groups are measured over
long enough time periods.
Finally, the method of presenting data to managers
for analysis tends to obscure changes as they occur over
time. On a line with each unit subdivision are listed the
manhours that subdivision spent in each category of pro-
ductive and non-productive time, along with the percentage
figure that time represents of the subdivision's total
time. Only information of the current month is presented
on the report, which means that reports of previous months
must be removed from the files in order to analyse changes
or any trends that might be developing. This requires an




The Objectives of Personnel Information Systems
The problem of adequate criteria for setting up
useful information systems has bothered industrial
psychologists as well as economists. The difference in
interest of the two schools has implications for the
maintenance officer. Whereas the economist is looking
for criteria that directly relate to the organization's
productive output, the personnel expert is interested in
optimizing. the "goodness or worth of the individual
members of tne organization. The latter approach
assumes that the individual productivity of workders can
be increased by training, selection, and placement pro-
cedures, and other human relations techniques, and proper
criteria for measuring this increase are indices such as
efficiency ratings, individual production records, number
of lines typed per hour, number of errors per day, and
number of pieces produced per day. ^This type of data has
obvious usefulness for evaluation of worker performance
^"2Roger Bellows, Third edition, Psychology of
Personnel in Business and Industry (Prentice-Hal, Inc.,




and promotion potential. Very often, wage scales, piece
rate pay, and low-level promotions are tied directly to
this type of criteria. But a major failing of this
approach to personnel information system design is that,
like suboptimizaticn in general, it often is incompatible
with or insensitive to higher level objectives. For
instance, one worker may have a superior production out-
put record but achieve the record at the expense of the
quality of his work, or, because of his personality,
prevent other workers around him from producing at their
best rate. "Spillover" effects of limited criteria can
cause the organization to be supporting a system that
contributes nothing to its total output. A second common
error of criteria choice, insensitivity to higher level
objectives, also is common in human relations information
systems. In an attempt to prevent spillover effects,
often criteria such as supervisor ratings or "overall
merit" ratings are used to attempt to measure the sum
contribution of the individual to the organization. Rely-
ing on the judgement of supervisors or peers, the assumption
is made that the organization's output or success correlate
with these judgements. If this were true, total output
would rise and fall, everything else being equal, as the
average of the ratings of all workers rose or fell.
Directors of personnel merit rating systems, however, do
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not even attempt to correlate their rating data with
higher level criteria such as organizational profitability.
The Navy personnel evaluation and advancement
philosophy .raphicly illustrates the objectives of most
personnel programs. The administration of the Navy's
personnel promotion and performance evaluation system is
independed of other systems for evaluating and measuring
the output or effectiveness of organizations. The
individual's performance evaluation or promotion is
insulated from the performance of his organization. In
effect, the individual is responsible for his own perfor-
mance but is not penalized or rewarded for the total
effectiveness of his organization. Additionally, Navy
personnel evaluation attempts to recognize contributions
the individual makes that do not aid his particular organ-
ization, but rather contribute to larger objectives of
the Navy or the national interest. Recognition of civic
activity, longevity, and medals and awards are examples
of this. In short, the objective of the Navy's personnel
evaluation and promotion system is to identify and pro-
mote individuals in an equitable manner that will serve
the long run, larger interests of the Navy. But, it is a
waste of time to attempt to use this system to evaluate
the utilization of personnel toward measurable, immediate
organizational objectives.









